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Electronic information is increasingly often shared among entities without complete mutual trust. To address
related security and privacy issues, a few cryptographic techniques have emerged that support privacy-preserving
information sharing and retrieval. One interesting open problem in this context involves two parties that need to assess
the similarity of their datasets, but are reluctant to disclose their actual content. This paper presents an efficient and
provably-secure construction supporting the privacy-preserving evaluation of sample set similarity, where similarity
is measured as the Jaccard index. We present two protocols: the first securely computes the (Jaccard) similarity of
two sets, and the second approximates it, using MinHash techniques, with lower complexities. We show that our
novel protocols are attractive in many compelling applications, including document/multimedia similarity, biometric
authentication, and genetic tests. In the process, we demonstrate that our constructions are appreciably more efficient
than prior work.
1 Introduction
The availability of electronic information is essential to the functioning of our communities. Increasingly often,
data needs to be shared between parties without complete mutual trust. Naturally, this raises important privacy con-
cerns with respect to the disclosure and the long-term safety of sensitive content. One interesting problem occurs
whenever two or more entities need to evaluate the similarity of their datasets, but are reluctant to openly disclose
their data. This task faces three important technical challenges: (1) how to identify a meaningful metric to estimate
similarity, (2) how to compute a measure thereof such that no private information is revealed during the process, and
(3) how to do so efficiently. We address such challenges by introducing a cryptographic primitive called EsPRESSo
– Privacy-Preserving Evaluation of Sample Set Similarity. Among others, this construction is appealing in a few
relevant applications, presented below.
Document similarity: Two parties need to estimate the similarity of their documents, or collections thereof. In
many settings, documents contain sensitive information and parties may be unwilling, or simply forbidden, to reveal
their content. For instance, program chairs of a conference may want to verify that none of submitted papers is also
under review in other conferences or journals, but, obviously, they are not allowed to disclose papers in submission.
Likewise, two law enforcement authorities (e.g., the FBI and local police), or two investigation teams with different
clearance levels, might need to share documents pertaining suspect terrorists, but they can do so only conditioned upon
a clear indication that content is relevant to the same investigation.
Iris Matching: Biometric identification and authentication are increasingly used due to fast and inexpensive devices
that can extract biometric information from a multitude of sources, e.g., voice, fingerprints, iris, and so on. Clearly,
given its utmost sensitivity, biometric data must be protected from arbitrary disclosure. Consider, for instance, an
agency that needs to determine whether a given biometric appears on a government watch-list. As agencies may have
different clearance levels, privacy of biometric’s owner needs to be preserved if no matches are found, but, at the same
time, unrestricted access to the watch-list cannot be granted.
∗A preliminary version of this paper was published in the Proceedings of the 7th ESORICS International Workshop on Digital Privacy
Management (DPM 2012). This is the full version, appearing in the Journal of Computer Security.
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Multimedia File Similarity: Digital media, e.g., images, audio, video, are increasingly relevant in today’s comput-
ing ecosystems. Consider two parties that wish to evaluate similarity of their media files, e.g., for plagiarism detection:
sensitivity of possibly unreleased material (or copyright issues) may prevent parties from revealing actual content.
EsPRESSO does not only appeal to examples above, but are also relevant to a wide spectrum of applications, for
instance, in the context of privacy-preserving sharing of information and/or recommender systems, e.g., to privately
assess similarity of genomic information [5], social network profiles [4], attackers’ information [30], etc.
1.1 Technical Roadmap & Contributions
Our first step is to identify a metric for effectively evaluating similarity of sample sets. Several similarity measures
are available and commonly used in different contexts, such as Cosine, Euclidean, Manhattan, Minkowski similar-
ity, or Hamming and Levenshtein distances. In this paper, we focus on a well-known metric, namely, the Jaccard
Similarity Index [24], which quantifies the similarity of any two sets A and B. It is expressed as a rational number
between 0 and 1, and, as showed in [9], it effectively captures the informal notion of “roughly the same”. The Jaccard
Index can be used, e.g., to find near duplicate records [55] and similar documents [9], for web-page clustering [51],
data mining [52], and genetic tests [16, 18, 44]. Also note that, as sample sets can be relatively large, in distributed
settings an approximation of the index is oftentimes preferred to its exact calculation. To this end, MinHash tech-
niques [9] are often used to estimate the Jaccard index, with remarkably lower computation and communication costs
(see Section 2.1).
We define and instantiate a cryptographic primitive for efficient privacy-preserving evaluation of sample set sim-
ilarity (or EsPRESSo, for short). We present two instantiations, that allow two interacting parties to compute and/or
approximate the Jaccard similarity of their private sets, without reciprocally disclosing any information about their
content (or, at most, their size). Our main cryptographic building block is Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-
CA) [21], which we review in Section 2.2. Specifically, we use PSI-CA to privately compute the magnitude of set
intersection and union, and we then derive the value of the Jaccard index. As fast (linear-complexity) PSI-CA proto-
cols become available (e.g., [17]), this can be done efficiently, even on large sets. Nonetheless, our work shows that,
using MinHash approximations, one can obtain an estimate of the Jaccard index with remarkably increased efficiency,
by reducing the size of input sets (thus, the number of underlying cryptographic operations).
Privacy-preserving evaluation of sample set similarity is appealing in many scenarios. We focus on document and
multimedia similarity as well as iris matching, and show that privacy is attainable with low overhead. Experiments
demonstrate that our generic technique – while not bounded to any specific application – is appreciably more efficient
than state-of-the-art protocols that only focus on one specific scenario, while maintaing comparable accuracy. Finally,
in the process of reviewing related work, we identify limits and flaws of some prior results.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Next section introduces building blocks, then Section 3
presents our construction for secure computation of Jaccard index and an even more efficient technique to (privately)
approximate it. Then, Sections 4, 5, and 6 present our constructions for privacy-preserving similarity evaluation of,
respectively, documents, irises, and multimedia content. Finally, Section 7 sketches a very efficient protocol that
privately approximates set intersection cardinality, additionally hiding input set sizes, while the paper concludes in
Section 8. Appendix A presents some more details on MinHash, and Appendix B shows a flaw in the protocol for
secure document similarity in [28].
2 Preliminaries
This section provides some relevant background information on Jaccard index, MinHash techniques, and our main
cryptographic building blocks.
2.1 Jaccard Similarity Index and MinHash Techniques
Jaccard Index. One of the most common metrics for assessing the similarity of two sets A and B (hence, of data
they represent) is the Jaccard index [24], defined as J(A,B) = |A ∩ B|/|A ∪ B|. Values close to 1 suggest that two
sets are very similar, whereas, those closer to 0 indicate that A and B are almost disjoint. Note that the Jaccard index
of A and B can be rewritten as a mere function of the intersection: J(A,B) = |A ∩B|/(|A|+ |B| − |A ∩B|).
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MinHash Techniques. Clearly, computing the Jaccard index incurs a complexity linear in set sizes. Thus, in the
context of a large number of big sets, its computation might be relatively expensive. In fact, for each pair of sets,
the Jaccard index must be computed from scratch, i.e., no information used to calculate J(A,B) can be re-used for
J(A,C). (That is, similarity is not a transitive measure.) As a result, an approximation of the Jaccard index is often
preferred, as it can be obtained at a significantly lower cost, e.g., using MinHash [9]. Informally, MinHash techniques
extract a small representation hk(S) of a set S through deterministic (salted) sampling. This representation has a
constant size k, independent from |S|, and can be used to compute an approximation of the Jaccard index. The
parameter k also defines the expected error with respect to the exact Jaccard index. Intuitively, larger values of k
yield smaller approximation errors. The computation of hk(S) also incurs a complexity linear in set sizes, however,
it must be performed only once per set, for any number of comparisons. Thus, with MinHash techniques, evaluating
the similarity of any two sets requires only a constant number of comparisons. Similarly, the bandwidth used by two
interacting parties to approximate the Jaccard index of their respective sets is also constant (i.e., O(k)).
There are two strategies to realize MinHashes: one employs multiple hash functions, while the other is built from
a single hash function. This paper focuses on the former technique. Thus, we defer the description of the latter to
Appendix A, which also overviews possible MinHash instantiations.
MinHash with many hash functions. Let F be a family of hash functions that map items from set U to distinct τ -
bit integers. Select k different functions h(1)(·), . . . , h(k)(·) fromF ; for any set S ⊆ U , let h(i)min(S) be the item s ∈ S
with the smallest value h(i)(s) . The MinHash representation hk(S) of set S is a vector hk(S) = {h(i)min(S)}ki=1. The
Jaccard index J(A,B) is estimated by counting the number of indexes i-s, such that that h(i)min(A) = h
(i)
min(B), and
this value is then divided by k. Observe that it holds that h(i)min(A) = h
(i)
min(B) iff the minimum hash value of A ∪B
lies in A ∩B.
This measure can be obtained by computing the cardinality of the intersection of hk(A) and hk(B) as follows.
Each element ai of the vector hk(A) is encoded as 〈ai, i〉. Similarly, 〈bi, i〉 represents the i-th element of vector
hk(B). An unbiased estimate of the Jaccard index of A and B is given by:
sim(A,B) =
∣∣{〈ai, i〉}ki=1 ∩ {〈bi, i〉}ki=1∣∣
k
(1)
As discussed in [10], if F is a family of min-wise independent hash functions, then each value of a fixed set A
has the same probability to be the element with the smallest hash value, for all functions in F . Specifically, for each
min-wise independent hash function h(i)(·) and for any set S, we have that, for any sj , sl ∈ S, Pr[sj = h(i)min(S)] =
Pr[sl = h
(i)
min(S)]. Thus, we also obtain that Pr[h
(i)
min(A) = h
(i)
min(B)] = J(A,B). In other words, if r is a random
variable that is 1 when h(i)min(A) = h
(i)
min(B) and 0 otherwise, then r is an unbiased estimator of J(A,B); however,
in order to reduce its variance, such random variable must be sampled several times, i.e., k ≫ 1 hash values must be
used. In particular, by Chernoff bounds [12], the expected error of this estimate is O(1/
√
k) [9].
Approximating (Jaccard) Similarity of Vectors without MinHash. If one needs to approximate the Jaccard index
of two fixed-length vectors (rather than sets), one could use other (more efficient) techniques similar to MinHash.
Observe that a vector −→S can be represented as a set S = {〈si, i〉}, where si is simply the i-th element of −→S . We now
discuss a new efficient strategy to approximate the Jaccard index of two vectorsA = {〈ai, i〉}ni=1, B = {〈bi, i〉}ni=1 of
lengthn, without using MinHash. Our approach incurs constant (O(k)) computational and communication complexity,
i.e., it is independent from the length of the vectors being compared.
First, select k random values (r1, . . . , rk), for ri uniformly distributed in [1, n], and compute Ak = {〈ari , ri〉}ki=1
and Bk = {〈bri , ri〉}ki=1, respectively. The value δ = |Ak ∩ Bk|/k can then be used to assess the similarity of A and
B. We argue that δ is an unbiased estimate of J(A,B): for each α ∈ (Ak ∪Bk) we have that Pr[α ∈ (Ak ∩ Bk)] =
Pr[α ∈ (A∩B)] since α ∈ (A∩B)∧α ∈ (Ak ∪Bk)⇔ α ∈ (Ak ∩Bk). We also have Pr[α ∈ (A∩B)] = J(A,B),
thus, δ is indeed an unbiased estimate of J(A,B).
The above algorithm implements a perfect min-wise permutation for this setting: since elements (r1, . . . , rk) are
uniformly distributed, for each i ∈ [1, k] any element in A and B has the same probability of being selected. As such,
similar to MinHash with many hash functions, the expected error is also O(1/
√
k).
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Alice, on input Bob, on input
A = {a1, . . . , av}, |B| B = {b1, . . . , bw}, |A|
Ra ← Zq (bˆ1, . . . , bˆw)← Π(B)
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v : ∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w : hbj = H(bˆj)
hai = H(ai);
αi = (hai)Ra
{α1, . . . , αv}
// Rb ← Zq
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v : α′i = (αi)
Rb
(α′ℓ1 , . . . , α
′
ℓv
) = Π′(α′1, . . . , α
′
v)
∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w : βj = (hbj)
Rb
∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w : tbj = H
′(βj)
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v:
{tb1, . . . , tbw}
{α′ℓ1
, . . . , α′ℓv
}
oo
β′i = (α
′
ℓi
)1/Ra mod q
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v:
tai = H′(β′i)
P Output: |{tb1, . . . , tbw} ∩ {ta1, . . . , tav}|
Figure 1: PSI-CA protocol from [17], denoted as DGT12, executed on common input of two primes p and q (such that q|p− 1),
a generator g of a subgroup of size q and two hash functions, H and H′, modeled as random oracles. Π(·) and Π′(·) denote random
permutations. All computation is mod p.
2.2 Cryptography Background
Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA). PSI-CA is a cryptographic protocol involving two parties: Alice,
on input A= {a1, . . . , aw}, and Bob, on input B = {b1, . . . , bv}, such that Alice outputs |A ∩ B|, while Bob has no
output. In the last few years, several PSI-CA protocols have been proposed, including [17, 21, 32, 54].
De Cristofaro et al.’s PSI-CA [17]. Throughout this paper, we will use the PSI-CA construction presented by De
Cristofaro, Gasti, and Tsudik in [17], denoted as DGT12 in the rest of the paper, as it offers the best communication
and computation complexities (linear in set sizes). DGT12 is secure, in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, under
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH) in the Random Oracle Model (ROM).
The DGT12 protocol is illustrated in Fig. 1. First, Alice hashes and masks its set items (ai-s) with a random
exponent (Ra) and sends resulting values (αi-s) to Bob, which “blindly” exponentiates them with its own random
value Rb. Bob then shuffles the resulting values (α′i-s) and sends them to Alice. Then, Bob sends Alice the output of a
one-way function,H′(·), computed over the exponentiations of Bob’s (hashed and shuffled) items (bj-s) to randomness
Rb. Finally, Alice tries to match one-way function outputs received from Bob with one-way function outputs computed
over the shuffled (α′i-s) values, stripped of the initial randomness Ra. Alice learns the set intersection cardinality (and
nothing else) by counting the number of such matches. Unless they correspond to items in the intersection, one-
way function outputs received from Bob cannot be used by Alice to learn related items in Bob’s set (under the DDH
assumption). Also, Alice does not learn which items are in the intersection as the matching occurs using shuffled αi
values.
DGT12 requires O(|A|+ |B|) offline and O(|A|) online modular exponentiations in Zp with exponents from sub-
group Zq . (Offline operations are computed only once, for any number of interactions and any number of interacting
parties). Communication overhead amounts to O(|A|) elements in Zp and O(|B|) – in Zq . (Assuming 80-bit security
parameter, |q| = 160 bits and |p| = 1024 bits.)
Protocol correctness is easily verifiable: for any ai held by Alice and bj held by Bob, if ai = bj (hence, hai = hbj),
we obtain:
taℓi = H
′(β′ℓi) = H
′(αℓi
(1/Ra)) = H′(hai
Rb) = H′(hbj
Rb) = H′(βj) = tbj
Hence, Alice learns set intersection cardinality by counting the number of matching pairs (taℓi , tbj).
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Adversarial Model. We use standard security models for secure two-party computation, which assume adversaries
to be either semi-honest or malicious.1 As per definitions in [22], protocols secure in the presence of semi-honest
adversaries assume that parties faithfully follow all protocol specifications and do not misrepresent any information
related to their inputs, e.g., size and content. However, during or after protocol execution, any party might (passively)
attempt to infer additional information about other party’s input.
Whereas, security in the presence of malicious parties allows arbitrary deviations from the protocol. Security
arguments in this paper are made with respect to semi-honest participants.
3 Privacy-preserving Sample Set Similarity
This section presents and analyzes our protocols for privacy-preserving computation of sample set similarity, via
secure computation of the Jaccard Similarity index.
3.1 Protocols Description
We propose two protocols – both based on Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA). The first protocol pro-
vides secure and exact computation of the Jaccard index, whereas, the other securely approximates it, using MinHash
techniques, incurring significantly lower communication and computation overhead.
Privacy-Preserving Computation of Jaccard Index. Fig. 2 illustrates our first protocol construction for securely
computing the Jaccard index. It involves two parties, Alice and Bob, on input sets A and B, respectively, that wish to
compute J(A,B) in a privacy-preserving manner, i.e., in such a way that nothing is revealed about their input sets –
besides their size and joint Jaccard index.
Given |A|, |B| and J(A,B), the size of the intersection between A and B can be easily computed as |A ∩ B| =
J(A,B) · (|A| + |B|)/(J(A,B) + 1). In other words, knowledge of (|A|, |B|, J(A,B)) is equivalent to knowledge
of (|A|, |B|, |A ∩ B|). Therefore, in our protocol Alice computes |A ∩ B| and uses it – together with her input –
to derive J(A,B). As it is customary in secure-computation protocols, the size of parties’ input is available to the
counterpart, thus, it is included as part of the protocol input. The protocol does not assume any specific secure PSI-CA
instantiation.
Privacy-preserving computation of J(A,B)
(Run by Alice and Bob, on input, resp., (A, |B|), (B, |A|))
1. Alice and Bob execute PSI-CA on input, respectively, (A, |B|) and (B, |A|)
2. Alice learns c = |A ∩ B|
3. Alice computes u = |A ∪ B| = |A|+ |B| − c
4. Alice outputs J(A,B) = c/u
Figure 2: Proposed protocol for privacy-preserving computation of set similarity.
Privacy-Preserving Approximation of Jaccard Index using MinHash. The computation of the Jaccard index,
with or without privacy, can be relatively expensive when (1) sample sets are very large, or (2) each set must be com-
pared with a large number of other sets – since for each comparison, all computation must be re-executed from scratch.
Thus, MinHash is often used to estimate the Jaccard index, trading (bounded) error with appreciably faster computa-
tion. In order to jointly and privately approximate J(A,B) as sim(A,B), Alice and Bob agree on k and select a ran-
dom subset of their sets using the MinHash technique in Section 2.1. In particular, Alice computes {〈ai, i〉}ki=1 where
ai = h
(i)
min(A), and Bob computes {〈bi, i〉}ki=1 for bi = h(i)min(B). Similarity of two sample sets is then computed as
sim(A,B) = |{〈ai, i〉}ki=1 ∩ {〈bi, i〉}ki=1|/k using any secure instantiation of PSI-CA. Therefore, privacy-preserving
estimation of the Jaccard index, using multi-hash MinHash, can be reduced to securely computing cardinality of set
intersection. The resulting protocol is presented in Fig. 3 below.
1Hereafter, the term adversary refers to protocol participants. Outside adversaries are not considered, since their actions can be mitigated via
standard network security techniques.
5
Private Jaccard index estimation sim(A,B)
Run by Alice and Bob, on common input k and private input {〈ai, i〉}ki=1 (for Alice) and
{〈bi, i〉}
k
i=1 (for Bob)
1. Alice and Bob execute PSI-CA on input, resp., ({〈ai, i〉}ki=1, k) and ({〈bi, i〉}ki=1, k)
2. Alice learns δ = |{〈ai, i〉}ki=1 ∩ {〈bi, i〉}ki=1|
3. Alice outputs sim(A,B) = δ/k
Figure 3: Proposed protocol for privacy-preserving approximation of set similarity.
It is easy to observe that, compared to the Jaccard index computation (Fig. 2), the use of MinHash leads to executing
PSI-CA on smaller sets, as k ≪ Min(|A|, |B|). Communication and computation overhead only depend on k, since
inputs to PSI-CA are now sets of k items.
3.2 Security Analysis
Security of Privacy-Preserving Computation of Jaccard Index. Informally, by running the protocol in Fig. 2,
parties do not reciprocally disclose the content of their private sets. Alice learns similarity computed as the Jaccard
index, while both parties learn the size of the other party’s input.
The security of the protocol in Fig. 2 relies on the security of the instantiation of the underlying PSI-CA protocol.
In particular we assume that, in the semi- honest model, PSI-CA only reveals |A ∩ B| to Alice, while Bob learns
nothing besides |A|.
Alice and Bob do not exchange any information besides messages related to the PSI-CA protocol. For this reason,
a secure implementation of the underlying PSI-CA guarantees that neither Alice nor Bob learn additional information
about the other party’s set. Since knowledge of (|A|, |B|, J(A,B)) is equivalent to knowledge of (|A|, |B|, |A ∩B|),
the protocol in Fig. 2 is secure in the semi-honest setting.
Security of Privacy-Preserving Approximation of Jaccard Index. Similar to the protocol in Fig. 2, the security
of protocol in Fig. 3 relies on the security of the underlying PSI-CA construction. In particular, sim(A,B) is defined
as the size of the intersection between {〈ai, i〉}ki=1 and {〈bi, i〉}ki=1, divided by a (public) constant k. Therefore,
any information Alice and Bob learn about the other party’s input can also be used to break the underlying PSI-CA
protocol. Since the PSI-CA protocol is assumed to be secure, Alice and Bob do not learn additional information.
k is selected independently from |A| and |B|, therefore it does not reveal any information about the two sets.
PSI-CA, together with the way input is constructed, conceals the relationship between k and |A|, |B| by not disclosing
how many elements ai = aj and bi = bj for i 6= j on the parties’ inputs. Therefore, the protocol does not disclose the
size of Alice and Bob’s inputs.
Extension of Privacy-Preserving Approximation of Jaccard Index. In the previous protocol, Alice learns some
additional information compared to the protocol in Fig. 2. In particular, rather than computing the similarity – and
therefore the size of the intersection – of sets A and B, she determines how many elements from a particular subset of
A (constructed using MinHash) also appear in the subset selected from B. We now provide a brief overview of how
this issue can be fixed efficiently.
Alice andBob can construct their input sets (i.e., {〈ai, i〉}ki=1 and {〈bi, i〉}ki=1) using a set of Oblivious Pseudo Ran-
dom Function (OPRF) evaluations2 rather than a set of hash functions: Alice and Bob engage in a multi-party protocol
where Alice inputs her set A = {a1, . . . , av} and learns a random permutation of OPRFkeyj (a1), . . . ,OPRFkeyj (av)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Alice constructs her input selecting the smallest value OPRFkeyj (ai) for each j. Bob constructs
his input without interacting with Alice. While the cost of this protocol is linear in the size of the input sets, it is
significantly higher than that of protocol Fig. 3.
2An Oblivious Pseudo Random Function (OPRF) is a two-party protocol, involving one party, on input key, and another, on input s. At the end of
the interaction the former learns nothing, while the latter obtains fkey(s), where f is a pseudo-random function.
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3.3 Performance Evaluation
3.3.1 Privacy-Preserving Computation of Jaccard Index.
Cost of protocol in Fig. 2 is dominated by that incurred by the underlying PSI-CA protocol. While it could
be instantiated using any PSI-CA construction, we choose DGT12 in order to maximize efficiency. This protocol,
reviewed in Section 2.2, incurs linear communication and computational complexities, thus, overall complexities of
protocol in Fig. 2 are also linear in the size of sets. If we were to compute the Jaccard index without privacy, asymptotic
complexities would be same as our privacy-preserving protocol – i.e., linear. However, given the lack of cryptographic
operations, constants hidden by the big O(·) notation would be much smaller.
To assess the real-world practicality of resulting construction, protocol in Fig. 2 has been implemented in C (with
OpenSSL and GMP libraries), using 160-bit random exponents and 1024-bit moduli to obtain 80-bit security. We run
experiments on sets such that |A| = |B| = 1000. Recall that, in DGT12 items are always hashed (DGT12 assumes
ROM), so their size is non-influent. We use select SHA-1 as the hash function, thus, hashed items are 160-bit.
In this setting, protocol in Fig. 2 incurs (i) 0.5s total computation time on a single Intel Xeon E5420 core running
at 2.50GHz and (ii) 276KB in bandwidth. We omit running times for larger sets since, as complexities are linear, one
can easily derive a meaningful estimate of time/bandwidth for virtually any size.
We also implement an optimized prototype that further improves total running time by (1) pipelining computation
and transmission and (2) parallelizing computation on two cores. We test the prototype by running Alice and Bob on
two PCs equipped with 2 quad-core Intel Xeon E5420 processors running at 2.50GHz, however, we always use (at
most) 2 cores. On a conservative stance, we do not allow parties to perform any pre-computation offline. We simulate
a 9Mbps link, since, according to [41], it represents the current average Internet bandwidth in US and Canada. In this
setting, and again considering |A| = |B| = 1000, total running time of protocol in Fig. 2 amounts to 0.23s. Whereas,
the computation of Jaccard index without privacy takes 0.018s. Therefore, we conclude that privacy protection, in
our experiments, only introduces a (roughly) 12-fold slowdown, independently from set sizes.
Comparison to prior work. Performance evaluation above does not include any prior solutions, since, to the best
of our knowledge, there is no comparable cryptographic primitive for privacy-preserving computation of the Jaccard
index. The work in [48] is somewhat related: it targets private computation of the Jaccard index using Private Equality
Testing (PET) [34] and deterministic encryption. However, it introduces the need for a non-colluding semi-honest
third party, which violates our design model. Also, it incurs an impractical number of public-key operations, i.e.,
quadratic in the size of sample sets (as opposed to linear in our case). Finally, additional (only vaguely) related
techniques include: (i) work on privately approximating dot product of two vectors, such as, [29, 45], and (ii) prob-
abilistic/approximated private set operations based on Bloom filters, such as, [29, 31]. (None of these techniques,
however, can be used to solve problems considered in this paper.)
3.3.2 Privacy-Preserving Estimation of Jaccard Index with MinHash
We also tested the performance of our construction for privacy-preserving approximation of Jaccard similarity,
again, using DGT12, i.e., the PSI-CA from [17]. Once again, we select sets with 1000 items, 1024-bit moduli and
160-bit random exponents, and run experiments on two PCs with 2.5GHz CPU and a 9Mbps link. We select k = 400
in order to have an estimated error of about 5%. (Recall that, as mentioned in Section 2.1 the error is approximated as
1/
√
k).
In this setting, the total running time of protocol in Fig. 3 amounts to 0.09s – less than half compared to the one
in Fig. 2. Whereas, in the same setting, the approximation of Jaccard index without privacy takes 0.007s. Thus,
the slow-down factor introduced by the privacy-protecting layer (similar to the protocol proposed in Section 3.1) is
12-fold. Again, note that times for different values of k can be easily estimated since the complexity of the protocol is
linear.
Comparison to Prior Work. The estimation of set similarity through MinHash – whether privacy-preserving or not
– requires counting the number of times for which it holds that h(i)min(A) = h
(i)
min(B), with i = 1, . . . , k. We have
denoted this number as δ. Protocol in Fig. 3 above attains secure computation of δ through privacy-preserving set inter-
section cardinality. However, it appears somewhat more intuitive to do so by using the approach proposed by [4] in the
context of social-network friends discovery. Specifically, in [4], Alice and Bob compute, resp., {ai}ki=1 and {bi}ki=1,
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just like in our protocol. Then, Alice generates a public-private keypair (pk, sk) for Paillier’s additively homomorphic
encryption cryptosystem [43] and sends Bob {zi = Encpk(ai)}ki=1. Bob computes {(zi ·Encpk(−bi))ri}ki=1 for ran-
dom ri’s and returns the resulting vector of ciphertexts after shuffling it. Upon decryption, Alice learns δ by counting
the number of 0’s. Nonetheless, the technique proposed by [4] actually incurs an increased complexity, compared to
our protocol in Fig. 3 (instantiated with DGT12). Assuming 80-bit security parameters, thus, 1024-bit moduli and
160-bit subgroups, and 2048-bit Paillier moduli, and using m to denote a multiplication of 1024-bit numbers, multipli-
cations of 2048-bit numbers count for 4m. Using square-and-multiply, exponentiations with q-bit exponents modulo
1024-bit count for (1.5|q|)m. In [4], Alice performs k Paillier encryptions (i.e., 2k exponentiations and k multipli-
cations) and k decryptions (i.e., k exponentiations and multiplications), while Bob computes k exponentiations and
multiplications. Therefore, the total computation complexity amounts to (6 · 4 · 1.5 · 1024 + 4 · 4)mk = 36, 880m.
Whereas, our approach (even without pre-computation) requires both Alice and Bob to perform 4k exponentiations of
160-bit numbers modulo 1024-moduli and 2k multiplications, i.e., (4 · 1.5 · 160 + 2)km = 962mk, thus, our protocol
achieves a 38-fold efficiency improvement. Communication overhead is also higher in [4]: it amounts to (2 · 2048)k
bits; whereas, using PSI-CA, we need to transfer (2 · 1024 + 160)k bits, i.e., slightly more than half the traffic.
4 Privacy-Preserving Document Similarity
After building efficient (linear-complexity) primitives for privacy-preserving computation/approximation of Jac-
card index, we now explore their applications to a few compelling problems. We start with evaluating the similarity
of two documents, which is relevant in many common applications, including copyright protection, file management,
plagiarism prevention, duplicate submission detection, law enforcement. In last few years, the security community
has started investigating privacy-preserving techniques to enable detection of similar documents without disclosing
documents’ actual content. Below, we first review prior work and, then, present our technique for efficient privacy-
preserving document similarity.
4.1 Prior Work
The work in [27] (later extended in [39]) is the first to realize privacy-preserving document similarity. It realizes
secure computation of the cosine similarity of vectors representing the documents, i.e., each document is represented
as the list of words appearing in it, along with the normalized number of occurrences. Recently, Jiang and Saman-
thula [28] have proposed a novel technique relying on the Jaccard index and N -gram based document representa-
tion [38]. (Given any string, an N -gram is a substring of size N ). According to [28], the N -gram based technique
presents several advantages over cosine similarity: (1) it improves on finding local similarity, e.g., overlapping of
pieces of texts, (2) it is language-independent, (3) it requires a much simpler representation, and (4) it is less sensitive
to document modification. We overview it below.
Documents as sets of N-grams. A document can be represented as a set of N -grams contained in it. To obtain
such a representation, one needs to remove spaces and punctuation and build the set of successive N -grams in the
document. An example of a sentence, along with its N -gram representation (for N = 3), is illustrated in Fig. 4. The
similarity of two documents can then be estimated as the Jaccard index of the two corresponding sets of N -grams. In
the context of document similarity, experts point out that 3 results as a good choice of N [9].
the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog
↓
{azy, bro, ckb, dog, ela, equ, ert, fox, hel, heq, ick, jum, kbr, laz, mps, nfo,
ove, own, oxj, pso, qui, row, rth, sov, the, uic, ump, ver, wnf, xju, ydo, zyd}
Figure 4: Tri-gram representation.
To enable privacy-preserving computation of Jaccard index, and therefore estimation of document similarity, Jiang
and Samanthula [28] propose a two-stage protocol based on Paillier’s additively homomorphic encryption [43]. Sup-
pose Alice wants to privately evaluate the similarity of her document DA against a list of n documents held by Bob,
i.e., DB:1, . . . , DB:n. First, Bob generates a global space, |S|, of tri-grams based on his document collection. This
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way, DA as well as each of Bob’s document,DB:i, for i = 1, . . . , n, can be represented as binary vectors in the global
space of tri-grams: each component is 1 if the corresponding tri-gram is included in the document and 0 otherwise. In
the following, we denote with A the representation of DA and with Bi that of DB:i.
Then, Alice and Bob respectively compute random shares a and bi such that a + bi = |A ∩ Bi|. Next, they set
c = |A| − a and di = |B| − bi. Finally, Alice and Bob, on input (a, c) and (bi, di), resp., execute a Secure Division
protocol (e.g., [11, 1]) to obtain (a+ bi)/(c+ di) = |A ∩Bi|/|A ∪Bi| = J(A,Bi).
The computational complexity of the protocol in [28] amounts to O(|S|) Paillier encryptions performed by Alice,
and O(n · |S|) modular multiplications – by Bob. Whereas, communication overhead amounts to O(n · |S|) Paillier
ciphertexts.
Flaw in [28]. Unfortunately, protocol in [28] is not secure, since Bob has to disclose his global space of tri-grams
(i.e., the set of all tri-grams appearing in his document collection). Therefore, Alice can passively check whether or
not a word appears in Bob’s document collection. Actually, Alice can learn much more, as we show in Appendix B.
We argue that this flaw could be fixed by considering the global space of tri-grams as the set of all possible tri-grams,
thus, avoiding the disclosure of Bob’s tri-grams set. Assuming that documents are stripped of any symbol and contain
only lower-cased letters and digits, we obtain S = {a, b, . . . , z, 0, 1, . . . , 9}3. Unfortunately, this modification would
tremendously increase computation and communication overhead.
4.2 Our Construction
As discussed in Section 3, we can realize privacy-preserving computation of the Jaccard index using PSI-CA. To
privately evaluate the similarity of documents DA and any document DB:i, Alice and Bob execute protocol in Fig. 5.
Function Tri-Gram(·) denotes the representation of a document as the set of tri-grams appearing in it.
Alice (DA) Bob (DB:i)
A← Tri-Gram(DA) Bi ← Tri-Gram(DB:i){ }//
oo
|A ∩Bi| ← PSI-CA(A,Bi)
Output Similarity as J(A,Bi) =
|A ∩Bi|
|A|+ |Bi| − |A ∩Bi|
Figure 5: Privacy-preserving evaluation of document similarity of documents DA and DB:i.
Complexity. Complexity of protocol in Fig. 5 is bounded by that of the underlying PSI-CA construction. Using
DGT12, computational complexity amounts to O(|A| + |Bi|) modular exponentiations, whereas, communication
overhead – to O(|A| + |Bi|). Observe that, in the setting where Alice holds one documents and Bob a collection of
n documents, complexities should be amended to O(n|A| +∑ni=1 |Bi|). However, due to the nature of DGT12, Bob
can performO(
∑n
i=1 |Bi|) computation off-line, ahead of time. Hence, total online computation amounts to O(n|A|).
More efficient computation using MinHash. As discussed in Section 2.1, one can approximate the Jaccard index
by using MinHash techniques, thus, trading off accuracy with significant improvement in protocol complexity. The
resulting construction is similar to the one presented above and is illustrated in Fig. 6. It adds an intermediate step
between the tri-gram representation and the execution of PSI-CA: Alice and Bob apply MinHash to sets A and Bi,
respectively, and obtain hk(A) and hk(Bi). The main advantage results from the fact that PSI-CA is now executed on
smaller sets, of constant size k, thus, achieving significantly improved communication and computational complexi-
ties. Again, note that the error is bounded by O(1/
√
k).
Performance Evaluation. We now compare the performance of our constructions to the most efficient prior tech-
nique, i.e., the protocol in [28] (that, unfortunately, is insecure). We consider the setting of [28], where Bob maintains
a collection of n documents. Recall that our constructions use DGT12, i.e., the PSI-CA in [17]. Assuming 80-bit
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Alice (DA) Bob (DB:i)
A← Tri-Gram(DA) Bi ← Tri-Gram(DB:i)
hk(A)← MinHash(A) hk(Bi)← MinHash(Bi){ }//
oo
|hk(A) ∩ hk(Bi)| ←
PSI-CA(hk(A), hk(Bi))
Output Similarity Approximation as: sim(A,Bi) =
|hk(A) ∩ hk(Bi)|
k
Figure 6: Privacy-preserving approximation of document similarity of documents DA and DB:i.
security parameters, we select 1024-bit moduli and 160-bit random exponents. As [28] relies on Paillier encryption,
it uses 2048-bit moduli and 1024-bit exponents. In the following, let m denote a multiplication of 1024-bit numbers.
Multiplications of 2048-bit numbers count for 4m. Modular exponentiations with q-bit exponents modulo 1024-bit
count for (1.5|q|)m. The protocol in [28] requires O(|S|) Paillier encryptions and O(n · |S|) modular multiplications.
We need |S| = 363 = 46, 656 as we consider 3-grams and 26 alphabet letters plus [0–9] digits. Therefore, the total
complexity amounts to (4 · 1.5 · 1024 + 4n)|S|m = (6144 + 4n)|S|m ≈ (2.9 · 108 + 1.9 · 105n)m.
Our construction above requires (2 · 1.5 · 160n(max(|A|, {Bi}ni=1))m for the computation of Jaccard index sim-
ilarity and (1.5 · 160nk)m for its approximation. Thus, to compare performance of our protocol to that of [28], we
need to take into account the dimensions of A, Bi, as well as n and k. To this end, we collected 393 scientific papers
from the KDDcup dataset of scientific papers published in ArXiv between 1996 and 2003 [15]. The average number
of different tri-grams appearing in each paper is 1307. Therefore, cost of our two techniques can be estimated as
(2 · 1.5 · 160 · 1307n)m and (1.5 · 160 · nk)m, respectively. Thus, our technique for privacy-preserving document
similarity is faster than [28] for n < 2000. Furthermore, using MinHash techniques, complexity is always faster (and
of at least one order of magnitude), using both k = 40 and k = 100. Also, recall that, as opposed to ours, the protocol
in [28] is not secure.
Assuming that it takes about 1µs to perform modular multiplications of 1024-bit integers (as per our experiments
on a single Intel Xeon E5420 core running at 2.50GHz), we report estimated running times in Table 1 for increasing
values of n (i.e., the number of Bob’s documents).
We performed some statistical analysis to determine the real magnitude of the error introduced by MinHash, when
compared to the Jaccard index without MinHash. Our analysis is based on the trigrams from documents in the KDDcup
dataset [15], and confirms that the average error is within the expected bounds: for k = 40, we obtained an average
error of 14%, while for k = 100 the average error was 9%. This is acceptable, considering that the Jaccard index
actually provides a normalized estimate of the similarity between two sets, not a definite metric.
5 Privacy-Preserving Iris Matching
Advances in biometric recognition enable the use of biometric data as a practical mean of authentication and
identification. Today, several governmental agencies around the world perform large-scale collections of different
biometric features. As an example, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) collects face, fingerprint and
iris images, from visitors within its US-VISIT program [53]. Iris images are also collected from all foreigners, by
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ministry of Interior, as well as fingerprints and photographs from certain types of
travelers [23].
n [28] Fig. 5 Fig. 6
k = 100 k = 40
10 9.5 mins 6.3 secs 0.05 secs 0.05 secs
102 9.9 mins 63 secs 1.9 secs 1.9 secs
103 12.7 mins 10.4 mins 48 secs 19.2 secs
104 40.7 mins 1.74 hours 8 mins 3.2 mins
105 5.3 hours 17.4 hours 1.2 hours 32 mins
Table 1: Computation time of privacy-preserving document similarity. n denotes the number of documents.
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While biometry serves as an excellent mechanism for identification of individuals, biometric data is, undeniably,
extremely sensitive and must be subject to minimal exposure. As a result, such data cannot be disclosed arbitrarily.
Nonetheless, there are many legitimate scenarios where biometric data should be shared, in a controlled way, between
different entities. For instance, an agency may need to determine whether a given biometric appears on a government
watch-list. As agencies may have different clearance levels, privacy of biometric’s owner should be preserved if no
matches are found, but, at the same time, unrestricted access to the watch-list cannot be granted.
5.1 Prior Work
As biometric identification techniques are increasingly employed, related privacy concerns have been investigated
by the research community [13]. A number of recent results address the problem of privacy-preserving face recogni-
tion. The work in [19] is the first to present a secure protocol, based on Eigenfaces, later improved by [46]. Next, [42]
designs a new privacy-preserving face recognition algorithm, called SCiFI. Furthermore, the protocol in [6] realizes
privacy-preserving fingerprint identification, using FingerCodes [25]. FingerCodes use texture information from a
fingerprint to compare two biometrics. The algorithm is not as discriminative as traditional fingerprint matching
techniques based on location of minutiae points, but it is adopted in [6] given its suitability for efficient privacy-
preserving realization. Among all biometric techniques, this paper focuses on iris-based identification. The problem
of privacy-preserving iris matching has been introduced by Blanton and Gasti in [7], who propose an approach based
on a combination of garbled circuits [56] and homomorphic encryption.
5.2 Our Construction
A (human) iris can be digitalized as an n-bit string S = s1s2 · · · sn with an n-bit mask MS = ms1ms2 · · ·msn.
The mask indicates which bits of S have been read reliably. In particular, the i-th bit of S should be used for matching
only if the i-th bit of MS is set to 1. A common value for n, which we use in our experiments, is 2048. As, during
an iris scan, the subject may rotate its head, a right or left shift can occur in the iris representation, depending on the
direction of the rotation. Therefore, the distance between two irises A and B is computed as the minimum distance
between all rotations ofA and the representation ofB. In practice, it is reasonable to assume that the rotation is limited
to a shift of at most 5 positions towards left/right [7].
The matching between two irises, A and B, is computed via the Weighted Hamming Distance (WHD) of the
samples. Let M = (MA ∧MB); WHD is computed as:
WHD(A,B,M) =
HD(A ∧M,B ∧M)
‖M‖ (2)
where ‖·‖ denotes hamming weight, i.e. the number of string bits set to 1. Given a threshold t, ifWHD(A,B,M) < t,
we say that irisesA andB are matching. (Assuming a maximum rotation of 5 positions, the distance must be computed
11 times.)
In the following, we propose a probabilistic technique for privately estimating of WHD(A,B,M), that relies on
the construction for privacy-preserving estimation of Jaccard index based on MinHash (introduced in Section 3.1).
The error on the approximation is bounded by the MinHash parameter k.
Proposed protocol is illustrated in Fig. 7. Given any two n-bit strings X = {x1, . . . , xn} and Y = {y1, . . . , yn}
and a list of k values R = (r1, . . . , rk), with ri ∈ [1, n], ri 6= rj for all i 6= j, we define probabilistic function
ExtractR : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → ({0, 1} × {1, . . . , n})k as:
ExtractR(X,Y ) = {wr1 , . . . , wrk},where wri =
{ 〈xri , ri〉 if yri = 1
〈r, ri〉 with r ← {0, 1}τ otherwise
where x← Y represents uniform random sampling of element x from set Y .
Intuitively, for each value ri in R, ExtractR(X,Y ) selects the ri-th bit of X and encodes it with ri (e.g., concate-
nates the two), if the ri-th bit of Y is 1. If the ri-th bit of Y is 0, the function selects a random value end encodes it
with ri.
Given A,MA, B,MB, Alice and Bob privately determine WHD(A,B,MA ∧MB):
• Alice and Bob negotiate R.
• Alice computes CM = ExtractR(MA,MA); Bob computes SM = ExtractR(MB,MB).
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Alice (A) Bob (B)
A,MA (iris, mask) B,MB (iris, mask)
R = (r1, . . . , rk) R = (r1, . . . , rk)
CM = ExtractR(MA,MA) SM = ExtractR(MB,MB){ }//
c1 ← PSI-CA(CM , SM ) oo
C = ExtractR(A,MA) S = ExtractR(B,MB){ }//
c2 ← PSI-CA(C,S) oo
Output match as (n− c2)/c1 < t
Figure 7: Privacy-preserving iris matching of biometric A and B.
• Alice and Bob engage in a PSI-CA protocol where their inputs are CM and SM and Alice learns the output c1 of
PSI-CA. c1 corresponds to the number of bits set to 1 in both MA and MB at indices specified by R.
• Alice computes C = ExtractR(A,MA); similarly, Bob computes S = ExtractR(B,MB).
• Alice and Bob interact in a PSI-CA protocol with input C and S respectively; at the end of the protocol, Alice
learns c2, i.e., the size of the intersection of the subsets of A and B defined by R.
• Biometric A matches B iff (n− c2)/c1 < t.
5.3 Comparison to prior work
We now compare our technique for privacy-preserving iris matching to prior work, namely the technique in [7].
We compare our approach with the protocol in [7] because, at the time of writing, it provides the best performance for
privacy-preserving comparison of iris codes. First, observe that protocol in Fig. 7 estimates the Weighted Hamming
Distance with bounded error, whereas, construction in [7] yields its exact computation. However, as we discuss
below, the error incurred by our technique is low enough to be used in practice and achieves reduced computational
complexity. In fact, our probabilistic protocol could be used to perform a fast, preliminary test: if differences between
two irises are significant, then there is no need for further tests. Otherwise, the two parties can engage in the protocol
in [7] to obtain (in a privacy-preserving way) a precise result. Next, as opposed to the technique in [7], Alice also
learns an estimate on the number of bits set to 1 in the combined mask MA ∧MB , but not their position. However,
this information is not sensitive, thus, it does not leak any information about the iris sampled by Alice or Bob.
Optimization. As discussed above, it is reasonable to assume that Bob (e.g., the Department of Homeland Security)
holds a database with a large number of biometric samples, whereas, Alice (e.g., the Transportation Security Admin-
istration) has only one or few samples that she is searching in Bob’s database. To this end, we now show how the
protocol in Fig. 7 can be optimized, by pre-computing several expensive operations offline, for such a scenario.
Note that Bob can perform the offline phase of DGT12 (see Fig. 1) on all bits of his biometric samples: unlike the
protocol in [7], this is required only once, independently on the number of interactions between Bob and any user.
After negotiating with Bob the valuesR = (r1, . . . , rk), and before receiving her input, Alice pre-computes k pairs
〈α0,i = H(〈0, ri〉)R′c , α1,i = H(〈1, ri〉)R′c〉. (This assumes the use of DGT12.) Once Alice’s mask has been revealed,
she constructs the corresponding encrypted representation by simply selecting the appropriate element from each pair.
Similarly, she computes k triples (α0,i, α1,i, αρ,i) whereα0,i, α1,i, αρ,i represent 0, 1 and a random element in {0, 1}τ ,
respectively. Alice later uses such triples to represent each bit βi of her iris sample as αi = αβ,i if the corresponding
bit in the mask is 1, else, as αi = αρ,i. During the online phase, Alice selects the appropriate pre-computed values to
match the mask and the iris bits. Similarly, Bob inputs the selected bits of each record’s mask and iris into the PSI-CA
protocol.
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Protocol in Fig. 7
Offline Online
Bob ± 5-bit rot. 0.13 ms + 5.8 s/rec 71.5 ms/rec
no rot. 0.13 ms + 530 ms/rec 6.5 ms/rec
Alice ± 5-bit rot. 71.63 ms 71.5 ms/rec
no rot. 6.63 ms 6.5 ms/rec
Protocol in [7]
Offline Online
2.8 s + 71.55 ms/rec 97.2 ms + 134.28 ms/rec
2.6 s + 6.48 ms/rec 97.2 ms + 12.33 ms/rec
12.2 s + 3 ms/rec 20.34 ms/rec
11.7 s + 0.27 ms/rec 1.8 ms/rec
Table 2: Computation overhead of our randomized iris matching technique in Fig. 7 and that of [7]. Experiments are
performed with 5-bit left/right rotation and with no rotation of the iris sample. “rot” abbreviates “rotation” and “rec”
– “record”.
Performance Comparison. In Table 2, we report running times from implementations of, respectively, our protocol
in Fig. 7 and technique in [7]. We assume that about 75% of the bits in the mask are set to 1 (like in [7]). We set the
length of each iris and mask to 2048 bits and the database size to 320 irises, which is the number used in prior work.
All tests are run on a single Intel Xeon E5420 core running at 2.50GHz. We set k = 25, thus, obtaining an expected
error in the order of 1/
√
25, i.e., 20%.
Observe that online cost incurred by Bob with our technique is significantly lower compared to that of protocol
in [7]. Whereas, it is higher for Alice. Nonetheless, summing up the computation overhead incurred by both Alice and
Bob, our protocol always results faster that the one in [7] for the online computation.
The offline cost imposed on Bob is about twice as high as its counterpart in protocol from [7]. However, in our
protocol, the offline part is done once, for all possible interactions, independently from their number. Whereas, in [7],
the offline computation needs to be performed anew, for every interaction. In settings where Bob interacts frequently
with multiple entities, this may significantly effect protocol’s overall efficiency. Furthermore, the offline cost imposed
on Alice is markedly lower (several orders of magnitudes) using our technique.
We conclude that the protocol in Fig. 7 improves, in many settings, overall efficiency compared to state of the art.
However, it introduces a maximum error of about 20%, whereas, the scheme in [7] compute the exact – rather than
approximate – outcome of an iris comparison. Thus, a good practice is to use the scheme in Fig. 7 to perform an
initial selection of relevant biometric samples, using a threshold t′ > t, in order to compensate for the error. The final
matching on selected samples can then be done, in a privacy-preserving manner, using the protocol in [7].
6 Privacy-Preserving Multimedia File Similarity
Amid widespread availability of digital cameras, digital audio recorders, and media-enabled smartphones, users
generate a staggering amount of multimedia content. As a result, secure online storage (and management) of large
volumes of multimedia data becomes increasingly desirable. According to [57], YouTube received more than 13
million hours of video in 2010, and 48 hours of new content are uploaded every minute (i.e., 8 years of video each
day). Similarly, Flickr users upload about 60 photos every second.
Such an enormous amount of multimedia data prevents manual content curation – e.g., manually tagging all up-
loaded content to allow textual searches. For this reason, in recent years research has focused on automated tools
for feature extraction and analysis on multimedia content. A prominent example is Content-Based Image Retrieval
(CBIR) [49]. It allows automatic extraction of features from an image, a video, an audio file or any other multimedia
content. These features can then be compared across different files, establishing for example how similar two doc-
uments are. There are several available techniques to implement CBIR, including search techniques based on color
histograms [50], bin similarity coefficients [40], texture for image characterization [37], shape features [47], edge
directions [26], and matching of shape components such as corners, line segments or circular arcs [14].
In this section we design a generic privacy-preserving technique for comparing multimedia documents by compar-
ing their features. Our technique is based on Jaccard and MinHash, and is oblivious to the specific type of features used
to perform comparison.We implement a small prototype, which we use to evaluate the performance of our approach.
Prior Work. Motivated by the potential sensitivity of multimedia data, the research community has begun to develop
mechanisms for secure signal processing. For instance, authors in [20] are the first to investigate secure signal process-
ing related to multimedia documents. Then, the work in [35, 36] introduces two protocols to search over encrypted
multimedia databases. Specifically, it extracts 256 visual features from each image. Then, files are encrypted in a
distance-preserving fashion, so that encrypted features can be directly compared for similarity evaluation. Similarity
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is computed using the Jaccard index between the visual features of searched image and those of images in a database.
However, the security of the scheme relies on order-preserving encryption (used to mask frequencies of recurring
visual features), which is known to provide only a limited level of security [8].
Our Approach. We use the Jaccard index to assess the similarity of multimedia files. As showed in Section 3, we
can do so, in a privacy-preserving way, using protocol in Fig. 2. Our Privacy-preserving evaluation of multimedia file
similarity protocol is presented in Fig. 8. We denote a multimedia file owned by Alice as FA, and a file owned by Bob
as FB:i.
Alice (FA) Bob (FB:i)
A← Extract(FA) Bi ← Extract(FB:i){ }//
oo
|A ∩Bi| ← PSI-CA(A,Bi)
Output Similarity as J(A,Bi) =
|A ∩Bi|
|A|+ |Bi| − |A ∩Bi|
Figure 8: Privacy-preserving evaluation of multimedia file similarity.
Our approach is independent of the underlying feature extraction algorithm, even though protocol accuracy natu-
rally relies on the quality of the feature extraction phase. Once features have been extracted, our privacy-preserving
protocols only reveal their similarity, thus, without disclosing the features themselves. As an example, we instantiate
our techniques for privacy-preserving image similarity. Our approach for feature extraction is based on [36], since its
accuracy is reasonable enough for real-world use, using color histograms in the color space of Hue, Saturation and
Value (HSV). Thus, our scheme achieves the same accuracy of [36], in terms of precision and recall.
Once again, to obtain improved efficiency, similarity can be approximated using MinHash techniques, as per
protocol in Fig. 9. In this case, protocol performance and accuracy depend on the MinHash parameter k.
Alice (FA) Bob (FB:i)
A← Extract(FA) Bi ← Extract(FB:i)
hk(A)← MinHash(A) hk(Bi)← MinHash(Bi){ }//
oo
|hk(A) ∩ hk(Bi)| ←
PSI-CA(hk(A), hk(Bi))
Output Similarity Approximation as: sim(A,Bi) =
|hk(A) ∩ hk(Bi)|
k
Figure 9: Privacy-preserving approximation of multimedia file similarity.
Performance Evaluation. We test our technique with the same dataset used by [36], i.e., 1000 images from the
standard Corel dataset. We extract 256 features from each image, for a total of 256,000 features for the whole database.
We envision a user, Alice, willing to assess similarity of an image against an image database, held by Bob. We run
our protocol for privately computing the Jaccard index (“Exact” rows in Table 3) and for estimated similarity, using
MinHash with k = 100 (“Approximate” row). Table 3 summarizes our experiments. All tests are run on a single Intel
Xeon E5420 core running at 2.50GHz and show that privacy protection is attainable at a very limited cost.
Remark that a thorough performance comparison between our protocol and related work is out of the scope of this
paper, since the main effort of prior work has been achieving high accuracy in similarity detection, rather improving
efficiency. Thus, we defer it to future work. Nonetheless, the authors of [36] report that the running time of their
protocol is in the order of 1 second per image, on a hardware comparable to our testbed (a dual-core 3GHz PC with
4GB of RAM). Therefore, it is safe to assume that our protocol for privacy-preserving multimedia file similarity is
about one order of magnitude faster than available techniques, even without considering pre-computation.
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Offline Online
Bob Exact 0.13 ms + 33.28 ms/record 33.28 ms/record
Approximate 0.13 ms + 13 ms/record 13 ms/rec
Alice Exact 66.69 ms 33.28 ms/record
Approximate 26.13 ms 13 ms/record
Table 3: Computation cost of our multimedia documents similarity protocol.
7 Faster and Size-Hiding (Approximated) PSI-CA
Privacy-preserving computation of set intersection cardinality has been investigated quite extensively by the re-
search community [17, 21, 32, 54], motivated by several interesting applications, including: privacy-preserving au-
thentication and key exchange protocols [2], data and association rule mining [54], genomic applications [5], health-
care [32], policy-based information sharing [17], anonymous routing [58], and – as argued by this paper – sample set
similarity.
In many of the application scenarios, however, it may be enough to obtain an estimation, rather than the exact
measure, of set intersection cardinality. For instance, if PSI-CA is used to privately quantify the number of common
social-network friends (e.g., to assess profile similarity) [33], then one may want to trade off a bounded accuracy loss
with a significant improvement in protocol overhead (and without sacrificing the level of attained privacy protection).
Clearly, such an improved construction is particularly appealing whenever participants’ input sets are very large.
Using MinHash techniques, we can construct a protocol for privacy-preserving estimation of set intersection car-
dinality with (constant) computation and communication complexities, that only depend on the MinHash parameter
– i.e., O(k). Proposed construction is illustrated in Fig. 10. While we tolerate a bounded accuracy loss depending
on MinHash’s parameter k, i.e., O(1/
√
k), observe that our protocol achieves the same, provably-secure, privacy
guarantees as if we ran PSI-CA on whole sets.
Privacy-preserving approximation of |A ∩ B|
Run by Alice and Bob, on input, resp., A and B
1. Alice and Bob compute, {〈ai, i〉}ki=1 and {〈bi, i〉}ki=1, resp., using multi-hash
MinHash where: ai def= h(i)min(A) and bi
def
= h
(i)
min(B)
2. Alice and Bob execute PSI-CA on input, resp., ({〈ai, i〉}ki=1, k) and ({〈bi, i〉}ki=1, k)
3. Alice learns δ = |{〈ai, i〉}ki=1 ∩ {〈bi, i〉}ki=1|
4. Bob sends w to Alice
5. Alice outputs δ · (v + w)/(1 + δ)
Figure 10: Our technique for Approximated Private Set Intersection Cardinality.
Size-Hiding. Another factor motivating the use of MinHash techniques for PSI-CA is related to input size secrecy.
Available PSI-CA protocols always disclose, from the execution, at least an upper bound on input set sizes. Whereas,
protocol in Fig. 10 conceals – unconditionally – Alice’s set size, thus, achieving Size-Hiding Private Set Intersection
Cardinality. With this protocol, Alice and Bob do not need to disclose |A| and |B|. Rather, public protocol input
includes k, which is independent from |A| and |B|. Because secure PSI-CA, used as building block for the protocol
in Fig. 10, does not leak information about the input sets, neither party learns information about the ratio between k
and |A|, |B|. Considering recent results motivating the need for size-hiding features in private set operations (see [3]),
this additional feature is particularly valuable.
Note: While we leave as part of future work a thorough experimental performance evaluation, observe that PSI-CA
and the approximated and size-hiding protocol (using MinHash) are essentially the same protocols. The latter runs
on smaller, constant-size input (k): since the protocols have linear complexities, it is straightforward to assess the
performance spread.
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8 Conclusion
This paper introduced the first efficient construction for privacy-preserving evaluation of sample set similarity,
relying on the Jaccard index measure. We also presented an efficient randomized protocol that approximates, with
bounded error, this similarity index. Our techniques are generic and practical enough to be used as a basic building
block for a wide array of different privacy-preserving functionalities, including document and multimedia file simi-
larity, biometric matching, genomic testing, similarity of social profiles, and so on. Experimental analyses support
our efficiency claims and demonstrate improvements over prior results. As part of future work, we plan to study
privacy-preserving computation of other similarity measures, as well as to further investigate additional applications
and extensions.
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A Additional Details on MinHash Techniques
Single-Hash MinHashes. Besides the multiple-hash technique presented in Section 2, another approach for approx-
imating the Jaccard index using MinHash employs a single hash function. In this case, rather than selecting one value
per hash function, one selects the k values from set A that hash the to smallest integers. Specifically, let h(·) be a hash
function, and k a fixed parameter; for any set S, define hk(S) ⊂ S as the set of the pre-images of the k smallest hash
values of elements of S. Consider:
sim(A,B) =
|(hk(hk(A) ∪ hk(B))) ∩ (hk(A) ∩ hk(B))|
|hk(hk(A) ∪ hk(B))| (3)
It holds that sim(A,B) is an unbiased estimate of the Jaccard index of A and B. Again, by standard Chernoff
bounds [12], the expected error is O(1/
√
k).
MinHash Instantiations. In order to implement the MinHash schemes described in this paper, the hash function
should be defined by a random permutation over the set A ∪ B. Assuming m = |A ∪ B|, then one would need
Ω(m logm) bits to specify a truly random permutation, thus, yielding an infeasible overhead even for small values
of m. Broder, et al. [10] point out that one can obviate to this problem by using Min-wise Independent Permutation
(MWIP) families rather than random permutations. Using MWIPs, for any subset of the domain, any element is equally
likely to be the minimum, but the number of bits to specify such a permutation is showed to be still be relatively large,
i.e., Ω(m). In practice, however, one can allow certain relaxations. To this end, [10] introduces approximate MWIPs,
by accepting a small error ε. The authors require all items in a set S to have only a (almost equal) chance to become
the minimum element of A’s image under the permutation. Thus, for any approximate MWIP, implemented using
h
(i)
min(·) as defined above, for an expected relative error ε, it holds:∣∣∣∣Pr
[
h
(i)
min(S) = s
]
− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε|S|
A class of permutations often used in practice is one based on linear transformations. It is assumed that the universe
is Zp for some prime p and the family of permutation is constructed using a hash function computed as h(x) = ax+ b
mod p, where (a, b) ∈ (Z∗p,Zp). Such a linear transformations are easy to represent and efficiently calculable.
B Flaw in Private Document Similarity in [28]
In this section, we show that the protocol in [28] is not privacy-preserving (even in semi-honest model). In fact,
Bob, in order to participate in the protocol, must disclose his global space of tri-grams. Given this information, Alice
can efficiently check whether a word, e.g., w, appears in Bob’s document collection. Indeed, Alice computes w’s
tri-gram based representation, then she checks whether all such tri-grams appear in Bob’s public global space. If so,
Alice learns that w appears in a document held by Bob with some non-zero probability. Technically, this probability
is not 1 because Alice could have a false positive, i.e. w may not be in Bob’s documents even though w’s trigrams
are in Bob’s public global space. On the other hand, if at least one of the tri-grams of w is not in Bob’s public global
space, Alice learns that Bob’s documents do not contain w. This, obviously, violates privacy requirements. If Alice
and Bob include punctation and spaces in their tri-grams representation of their documents, the probability of false
positive becomes negligible. We do not exploit “relations” between consecutive meaningful words in the sentence,
which could potentially (further) aggravate information leakage about Bob’s documents.
We now show yet another attack that lets Alice learn even more, since the N-grams representation embeds doc-
ument’s structure. From the global space of tri-grams GS , we can construct a directed graph G(V,E) representing
relations between tri-grams in Bob’s document collection. Any path in such a graph will lead to a textual fragment
contained in some document held by Bob. A vertex in the graph represents a tri-gram; whereas, an edge between two
vertices implies that the two corresponding tri-grams are consecutive tri-grams in a word. Given a trigram x ∈ GS ,
with x(i) we denote the i-th letter in x. The directed graph G(V,E) is constructed as follows. The vertex set is
V = {Vx | x ∈ GS} and the edge set is E = {〈Vx, Vy〉 | x(2) = y(1) ∧ x(3) = y(2)}. A path Vx1 , . . . , Vxn in G, will
correspond to the string x(1)1 x
(2)
1 x
(3)
2 x
(3)
3 · · ·x(3)n . Such a string (or some of its substring) appears in some document
in Bob’s collection. By using algorithms based on Deep First Search visit of a graph, a vocabulary, and syntactic rules,
we could extract large document’s chunks. We did not explore further other techniques to extract “information” from
the global space of tri-grams as we consider them to be out of the scope of this paper.
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